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Abstract
This paper investigates banks’ corporate social responsibility. The
credit market is composed of two sectors: one for standard and one for
ethical projects. Since ethical banks are committed to investing in ethical
projects, standard and ethical banks compete in the market for ethical
projects. The latter have also a social profitability, but a lower expected
revenue with respect to standard ones. If their expected revenue is not
too low, ethical projects are undertaken by motivated borrowers. The lat-
ter obtain a benefit (a social responsibility premium) from accomplishing
ethical projects in general and a premium for successful interaction when
trading with ethical banks in the case the project is successful.
If the expected profitability of ethical projects is sufficiently close to
that of standard ones and/or the premium for successful interaction of mo-
tivated borrowers is sufficiently high, ethical banks are active, both sectors
of the credit market exist and the whole market is fully segmented. This
result holds true irrespective of the information structure: only moral
hazard on the borrower side, moral hazard and screening on the borrower
side. The optimal contract in our set-up is always a debt contract. How-
ever, its precise form and welfare properties depend on the information
structure.
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1 Introduction
According to the standard shareholder-value approach firms are controlled by
profit-maximizing shareholders and the firms’ interaction with other stakehold-
ers is simply managed by contracts and regulation. However, in recent years,
society’s and lawmakers’ interest and demand for corporate social responsibility
(CSR) have dramatically increased: the recently updated OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights are internationally recognized principles. The Green
Paper “Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility”
was prepared by the Commission of the European Communities in 2001 and
the new document “A renewed EU strategy for Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity” was published in 2011. CSR has been interpreted as a response to market
and redistributive failures alternative to government intervention. Following
Benabou and Tirole (2009), “a standard definition of CSR is that it is about
sacrificing profits in the social interest. For there to be a sacrifice, the firm must
go beyond its legal and contractual obligations, on a voluntary basis. CSR em-
braces a wide range of behaviors, such as being employee friendly, environment
friendly, mindful of ethics, respectful of communities where the firm’s plants
are located, and even investor friendly” (Bénabou and Tirole 2009, page 2).
In practice, as the authors clarify, CSR can be translated essentially in one of
the three following situations: the adoption of a more long-term perspective by
firms, the delegated exercise of prosocial behavior on behalf to stakeholders, and
insider-initiated corporate philanthropy.
CSR is also developing in the banking industry and it is becoming an im-
portant tool for many companies’ management and work force. CSR by lenders
(Ethical Banks) can be interpreted as delegated philanthropy since, as mentioned
before, the firm can be a channel of stakeholders’ values. In the case of bank-
ing, investors are obviously crucial stakeholders: socially responsible investors
provide savings to ethical banks and want the corporation to use their saving
to finance social responsible project and firms1 (see, for example, the Report
on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the U.S. prepared in 2007 by the
Social Investment Forum). Example of ethical banks are the following: Wain-
wright Bank2 and ShoreBank3 in the U.S.A., Cooperative Bank and Charity
Bank in the U.K., Ekobank in Sweden, Cultura Sparebank in Norway, Trio-
1Socially responsible investors frequently accept, for their investment, a lower interest rate
with respect to the market one.
2Eastern Bank Corp. has agreed to buy Wainwright Bank & Trust Co. in 2010. Since its
founding in 1987, Wainwright’s mission has been to invest in “socially responsible development
projects,” including ones related to the environment, affordable housing, AIDS, homeless
shelters, and immigration. (See "Eastern Bank to buy Wainwright" - The Boston Globe,
June 30, 2010)
3ShoreBank was founded in 1973 to prove that money could be lent profitably to
poor people in poor neighborhoods, an experiment that became known as "community-
development finance". On August 2010 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
called time on its experiment. (From "ShoreBank: Small Enough to Fail - The Sorry
End to a Bold Banking Experiment". Economist. August 26, 2010, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16891993).
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dos Bank in the Netherlands, Ethikbank and GLS Bank in Germany, LaNef
in France, Banca Popolare Etica and Banca Prossima in Italy, Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh, BID Amerique in Latin America and in the Caribbean area. In
Islamic banking (spread over 51 countries, including the United States), interest-
free loan (qard hassan) are today quite frequent and funds must comply with
Islamic principles (see also the Islamic Development Bank).
Also borrowers, when accomplishing ethical projects, can promote social val-
ues. Motivated borrowers may invest in projects providing services to individuals
(for example services to persons with disabilities or rehabilitation services), cul-
ture and education diffusion, may invest in projects promoting the environment
as well as art fruition and protection, access to work, protection and enhance-
ment of minorities, local and community development and so forth.
We define ethical banks as “corporate social responsible” lenders since they
can commit to fund only socially relevant projects. While borrowers are called
“motivated” since they prefer to engage in socially valuable activities, without
necessarily committing to them.
In spite of its importance, little consideration is given in the economics lit-
erature to ethics in finance in general and to ethics in banking in particular
(exception is the literature on microcredit, e.g., Stiglitz 1990, Besley and Coate
1995, Ghatak 1999 and the large empirical literature which followed). Few
works, mainly in the business literature, analyze ethical banks and show the
relevant role of ethical banking as an independent activity (e.g., Lynch, 1991;
San-Jose, Retolaza and Gutierrez, 2009). From Green (1989) and Lynch (1991)
there are two accepted characteristics to define the ethical banking: i) social
profitability, understood as funding economic activities with social added value
and as the absence in any case of investments in speculative projects or in those
that fulfill negative social criteria; ii) economic profitability, which means non
negative profits. The dimension of profit obviously refers to bank good manage-
ment, because ethical banks distribute benefits amongst stockholders only to a
limited extent.
In this paper we analyze banks CSR when offering loan agreements to en-
trepreneurs wishing to invest in ethical projects. In particular we investigate
how social responsible lenders and motivated borrowers interact with each other
when they compete in a credit market where also standard lenders and standard
borrowers do operate.
In the model, ethical projects are those providing both social4 and economic
advantages, but which deliver lower expected revenue with respect to standard
ones. Different from standard profit maximizing banks, socially responsible
4To give some examples of ethical projects, the Co-operative Bank (UK) supports both
smaller local charities and high profile international organizations. It invests in projects
within the renewable energy and carbon reduction sectors by funding a wide range of re-
newable energy projects. It provides services to Housing Associations including term loans
and investments. It actively supports social enterprises by helping organizations that share
its co-operative values of fairness and social responsibility and are committed to transform-
ing lives through making social, economic and environmental change. (From the website
http://www.co-operativebank.co.uk, consulted in November 2011)
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lenders commit to investing in ethical projects.5
Two types of borrowers exist in the market: standard profit maximizing
entrepreneurs and socially motivated ones. The latter obtain a non-monetary
premium for social responsibility when they can undertake an ethical project.
This premium is higher if the project is financed by an ethical bank and the
project is successful. We call this additional premium “premium for successful
interaction”. Given our assumptions, in equilibrium, motivated borrowers prefer
to trade with ethical banks as long as loan conditions are not too unfavorable
with respect to those offered by standard lenders. Standard borrowers, instead,
always prefer to invest in standard projects with standard banks.
Both project types are subject to moral hazard: motivated and standard
entrepreneurs can behave or misbehave (see Tirole 2006). As mentioned before,
motivated borrowers trading with ethical banks gain the premium for success-
ful interaction when the project is successful, thus making the moral hazard
problem less severe. Consequently, if the premium for successful interaction is
high enough (and/or the profitability of ethical projects is not much lower than
that of standard ones), we show that ethical banks can offer a better contract
to motivated borrowers than those offered by standard banks.
First we analyze the case where the borrowers’ behavior is private informa-
tion (moral hazard only). We then investigate the case where the borrowers’
behavior and their preferences for social issues are private information (moral
hazard and adverse selection both on the borrowers’ side).
Our results are all driven by the interplay of the two crucial parameters of the
model: the difference in expected revenue from standard and ethical projects
and the premium for successful interaction received by motivated borrowers
trading with ethical banks in the case the project succeeds.
We first show that only socially motivated borrowers potentially engage in
ethical projects. If they do not, then ethical banks cannot operate and the
market for ethical projects does not exist. If, instead, motivated borrowers un-
dertake ethical projects, then ethical banks are active and the market is fully
segmented. That is, standard agents trade among themselves in the market for
standard projects while ethical banks trade with motivated borrowers in the
market for ethical projects. This occurs, whatever the information structure
considered, when the premium for successful interaction is high enough (and/or
the difference between the two projects’ profitability is not too large). For larger
values of the successful interaction premium, ethical banks are active and they
even provide a higher funding to motivated borrowers than what received by
standard ones from standard banks, in any considered information structure.
Finally, in second-best when the premium further increases, ethical banks guar-
antee a larger revenue to motivated borrowers than what standard borrowers
can obtain. For these parameter values and if the borrowers’ type is not ob-
5As an example of commitment to ethical projects, on the web site of Charity Bank (UK)
one reads "Providing affordable charity loans and loans to social enterprises and other com-
munity organizations that benefit people and the planet, is our mission. As a charity and
social enterprise ourselves we understand how the sector works and are here to help your
organization". (Available at http://www.charitybank.org, consulted in November 2011)
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servable, standard borrowers would like to mimic motivated ones in order to
obtain the better contract conditions. As a consequence, in third-best, for high
values of the premium for successful interaction, self selection requires that mo-
tivated borrowers are worse off with respect to the second-best, while standard
borrowers receive the second best contract. Finally, whatever the information
structure considered, the optimal contract is always a debt one in both credit
markets.
In short, perfect segmentation of the credit market always increases the
overall efficiency. When the premium for successful interaction is high enough
(and/or the differential between profitability of the two project types is suf-
ficiently low), increased efficiency is driven by the overall premium for social
responsibility that increases the welfare of motivated borrowers undertaking
ethical projects beyond the simple expected profit. If the premium for success-
ful interaction is even larger, then there is a further efficiency gain, since the
socially responsible lenders and the motivated borrowers solve the moral hazard
problem in a cheaper way if they are matched together than if they are matched
with standard agents.
Our paper shares some similarities with Besley and Ghatack (2007) who
interpret CSR as the private provision of a public good in the product market.
In particular, the idea of motivated and standard borrowers operating in the
credit market is close to that of “caring” and “neutral” consumers coexisting
in the product market, where caring consumers are those who evaluate the
public good. Moreover, borrowers self-selecting either in the market for ethical
projects or in that for standard ones recall consumers choosing, in equilibrium,
either ethical brands or neutral ones. In both papers, CSR of banks in the
credit market and of firms in the product market is interpreted as a form of
“delegated philanthropy” and, competition leads banks’ and firms’ profits to
zero at the equilibrium. However, an important difference with respect to Besley
and Ghatack (2007) is that they solve a model with full information, whereas we
consider asymmetric information, which is a crucial issue in the credit market.
Finally, the beneficial matching between agents of similar type recalls Besley
and Ghatack (2005). However, they assume that the workers’ and employers’
types (whether the worker is mission oriented or not) are observable by the
partner; we instead consider also the case where private information exists on
the borrowers’ type as well. As a consequence the first part of our paper investi-
gates a situation similar to the one analyzed by Besley and Ghatack (2005) and
referring to a two sectors market, while the second one considers an extension
to the case of asymmetric information on the borrowers’ type.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe how socially
responsible lenders and motivated borrowers are modeled and how they interact
in the market where also standard profit maximizer agents exist. We also present
the different information structures considered in the paper. In Section 3 we
investigate loan agreements when the motivated and standard borrowers have
private information on the behavior exerted in making the project successful.
In Section 4 we analyze the case of loan agreements under moral-hazard and
adverse selection on the borrowers’ side. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model Set-up
The model borrows from Tirole (2006). We consider a credit market with a
large number of both risk neutral borrowers (she) and banks (it). We assume
zero risk free interest rate and an infinitely elastic supply of funds in the deposit
market.
Borrowers have to undertake a project which needs an investment. Each
borrower can apply for at most one loan and different projects type exist. We
call Ik the amount of the investment, where k ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator of the
type of project. When k = 1 the project is “ethical” and when k = 0 the project
is “not-ethical” or standard. The difference between the two projects will be
specified below. The borrower owns an asset A, with A < Ik. In words, the
borrowers have not enough capital and/or collateral whichever project they are
interested in, hence they have to borrow Ik −A. We assume for simplicity that
A is the same for all borrowers.6
If the project is undertaken it generates a cash flow per unit of investment
Rk ∈
{
RFk, RSk
}
, with RSk > RFk ≥ 0, where RSk is the cash flow per unit
of investment in case of success, and RFk in case of failure.
Ethical projects represent all projects leading to social benefits, beyond prof-
its (as an example projects that improve communities, and have a positive im-
pact on the environment). We do not model this aspect of ethical projects, which
will then be taken for granted. Ethical projects can be thought of as being a
subset of standard ones. For this reason one can assume that the profitability
of ethical projects is on average lower than that of standard ones. We capture
this idea by assuming that standard projects have a higher return in case of
success, that is: RS0 ≥ RS1 and RF0 = RF1 = RF , such that ∆R0 = R
S0−RF
> ∆R1 = R
S1 − RF . The two types of projects are perfectly observable and
have independent distributions. Finally, and considering both projects types,
the total cash flow is RXk · Ik > 0, with X ∈ {F, S}. RF Ik can be considered
as the liquidation value of the assets.
To summarize, in the credit market two sectors exist: the market for ethical
projects and the market for standard ones. The latter assures higher expected
returns to investors.
The project is subject to moral hazard: the entrepreneurs can behave or
misbehave. If they behave the probability of success is pH , otherwise it is pL,
with pH > pL. We define ∆p ≡ pH − pL. An entrepreneur who misbehaves
will enjoy a private benefit whose value is P · I. The private benefit will be
nought otherwise. The borrowers are protected by limited liability: hence their
income cannot be negative. Given limited liability, the moral hazard problem
is relevant even though both agents are risk neutral.
There are also two types of banks and entrepreneurs, denoted respectively
as i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1}. Both for lenders and borrowers type 0 denotes the
standard profit maximizing agents, while type 1 indicates the agents aware of
6See Section 5 for a short discussion on the implications of the alternative assumption that
ethical projects require a lower collateral A than standard ones.
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social issues. The percentage of motivated borrowers in the credit market is q
whereas that of standard ones is 1− q. This information is common knowledge.
Both in case of success and of failure, revenues are shared between lenders
and borrowers: LXkij and B
Xk
ij are respectively the income of a lender of type i
and that of a borrower of type j when trading with each other, if the investment
is of type k and the state of the world isX. We obviously have that LXkij +B
Xk
ij =
RXk · Ikij . Thus, a contract (B
Sk
ij , B
Fk
ij , I
k
ij) specifies the type of project, the
amount invested and, how revenues are shared between lenders and borrowers
both in case of success and of failure, given the type of the two agents trading
together.
The entrepreneurs payoff is:
Ukj = p (a)
(
BSkij + θ
Sk
ij
)
+ (1− p (a))
(
BFkij + θ
Fk
ij
)
−A+ (1− a)PIkij (1)
where a ∈ {0, 1} is the behavior of the entrepreneur. In particular, a = 0 if
the entrepreneur misbehaves, while a = 1 if she behaves. The entrepreneur’s
behavior determines the probability of success which becomes p (1) = pH and
p (0) = pL respectively.
Motivated borrowers can receive a premium for social responsibility, a non
pecuniary benefit with monetary value θXkij . Or, in line with Besley and Ghatack
(2007)’s interpretation of ethical and neutral consumers, motivated borrowers
“care” for the social benefit produced by ethical projects, whereas standard
borrowers do not.
Thus, the premium depends on the type of project and on the type of lender
in the following way:
θX0ij = 0, ∀X ∈ {F, S}
θX101 = θ, ∀X ∈ {F, S}
θS111 = θ
S > θF111 = θ
In words, the premium for social responsibility is positive only if a motivated
borrower undertakes an ethical project. In particular, θX101 = θ is the premium
when a motivated borrower undertakes an ethical project interacting with a
standard bank, whatever the project’s outcome. Whereas, when the motivated
borrower contracts with an ethical bank, the premium is higher in the case of
success than in the case of failure: θS111 = θ
S > θF111 = θ. This occurs since, in
a dynamic perspective, the motivated borrower anticipates that, if the ethical
bank makes profits, it will use the liquidity to finance other social and solidarity-
based projects. We define ∆θ = θ
S − θ, the premium for successful interaction,
that is, the additional premium of social responsibility accrued to a motivated
agent when she accomplishes an ethical project which was financed by an ethical
bank.7
7As it will be probably clear after we presented our main propositions, our results are
robust to the generalization θS101 > θ
F1
01 = θ
F1
11 , provided that θ
S1
11 > θ
S1
01 . In words: the
motivated borrower also receives an additional premium for successful interaction when she
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In practice, the motivated borrower always obtains the premium when un-
dertaking an ethical project but, once the loan contract has been signed, she
has more willingness to repay the debt to a socially responsible lender. Our
assumption is in line with Besley and Ghatack’s idea of good matching between
agents sharing the same mission.
Note that motivated borrowers prefer to undertake ethical projects as long
as their profitability is not too low with respect to standard ones. In that case
the total premium for social responsibility θ + ∆θ can eventually compensate
the difference in profitability between the two project types, as we will show
below. In our formulation, the motivated borrower behaves as a standard one,
if the gains in profits are sufficiently high. This is in line with the behavioral
literature where it is acknowledged that the psychological motives are relevant
if the material payoffs are not too big (see Rabin 1993).
On the contrary standard borrowers prefer the loan the contract that assures
them the highest expected revenue, whatever the type of project involved.
As we will show in Subsection 3.2, when the premium for successful interac-
tion is sufficiently high and ethical projects profitability is not too low, ethical
banks can control moral hazard at a lower cost with respect to standard lenders
trading with borrowers of the same type.
Standard lenders maximize their profits. When moral hazard problem is
taken care of, their expected profits become:
pHL
Sk
0j + (1− pH)L
Fk
0j − I
k
0j +A (2)
In principle, standard lenders can invest both in ethical and in standard projects.
In equilibrium, however, we will show that standard banks invest only in stan-
dard projects. In fact, standard borrowers prefer to undertake standard projects
given the latter’s higher expected revenue. Moreover, when undertaking ethical
projects, and all else equal, motivated borrowers prefer to trade with ethical
banks because of the premium for successful interaction ∆θ.
As mentioned in the introduction we interpret lenders’ corporate social re-
sponsibility as delegated philanthropy. In particular, the bank is a channel of
its stakeholders values: socially responsible investors provide savings to ethical
banks and want the corporation to use their saving to finance social responsi-
ble projects. In particular, ethical banks maximize expected profit as standard
lenders but, differently from them, commit in investing only in ethical projects.8
trades with a standard lender, provided that such a premium is lower than the one she receives
when successfully trading with an ethical bank.
This assumption would capture an additional premium for the success of the ethical project,
whatever the bank financing it. The crucial assumption is that the premium for successful
interaction depends on the type of lender in such a way that θS1
11
> θS1
01
. In fact, a successful
ethical project financed by an ethical bank necessarily implies that new ethical projects will
be financed in the future, whereas a successful ethical project financed by a standard bank
does not.
8 In a previous version of the paper we assumed that ethical banks maximized the total
revenue from ethical projects, in analogy with Blinder (1993)’s assumption for stakeholder-
oriented manufacturing firms. Nothing substantial changed in the analysis with respect to the
current version.
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As a consequence, socially responsible lenders’ objective function is:
pHL
S1
1j + (1− pH)L
F1
1j − I
1
1j +A (3)
Note that ethical banks only invest in ethical projects, no matter which type
of borrower is undertaking the ethical project, so that we can set k = 1 in
(3). Since ethical projects have a lower profitability than standard ones, ethical
banks are ready to sacrifice profits for the social interest. This is in line with
the definition of CSR provided in the introduction.
2.1 Information Structures
The assumption that the ethical nature of the project is common knowledge
seems rather natural, in fact it implies that the creditor can observe the invest-
ment that was financed.9
We will consider two versions of the model. In both versions the project type
is common knowledge and borrowers have private information on their behavior
(which may or may not increase the probability of success of the project).
In the former version of the model, the banks observe whether the borrow-
ers are motivated or not, but lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ behavior.
Hence, we do not allow for adverse selection issues. We call this model the
second-best one (Section 3).
Thereafter we relax the assumption that the agents’ types are common
knowledge and we capture the situation called “strategic corporate social re-
sponsibility” (see Baron 2001) where a firm can pretend to be socially respon-
sible only to strengthen its market position. In our setting, standard borrowers
are interested in receiving the contract designed for motivated borrowers since,
under some conditions, such a contract is preferred to the one designed for
standard borrowers. The case of moral hazard and adverse selection on the bor-
rowers’ side refers to the empirically relevant situation where lenders are banks
that built up a reputation or can set up credible commitment devices in their
statute, while borrowers are start-ups, new firms without reputation. We call
the solution of this model third-best and we characterize the optimal contracts
in Section 4.10
2.2 Preliminaries
Let us consider the cash flow per unit of investment I. In this subsection we omit
the superscript of the project type, k, since this does not raise any confusion.
9However, the borrower could use the loan to finance projects different from the contracted
one. In the present model, we will not deal with this kind of moral hazard and leave it for
future research.
10 In a previous version of the model, we also considered the situation where standard banks
may desire to attract motivated borrowers by pretending to be socially responsible. This has
meaning when lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ behavior but have private information
on their own corporate social responsibility. Such a case turns out to be quite trivial because
of the zero profit condition for lenders implying that the second-best allocation is always
implemented.
9
We will assume:
pHR
SIij + (1− pH)R
F Iij − Iij > 0
pLR
SIij + (1− pL)R
F Iij + PIij − Iij < 0
therefore the net present value of both projects (ethical and non-ethical) is
positive if the borrower behaves and negative otherwise. The two conditions
can be simplified into:
pH∆R +R
F > 1 (4)
pL∆R +R
F + P < 1 (5)
Hence, if it is not possible to take care of the moral hazard problem the invest-
ment, in both standard and ethical projects, cannot be carried over.
Expected profit of both standard and socially responsible lenders must be
non negative. The two lenders’ participation constraints
(
IRL0j
)
and
(
IRL1j
)
,
thus, correspond to:
pHL
S
ij + (1− pH)L
F
ij ≥ Iij −A. (6)
that is:
pH
(
RSIij −B
S
ij
)
+ (1− pH)
(
RF Iij −B
F
ij
)
=
pH
(
RS −RF
)
Iij − pH
(
BSij −B
F
ij
)
+RF Iij −B
F
ij ≥ Iij −A
or
pH∆RIij +R
F Iij − Iij −B
F
ij +A ≥ pH∆Bij (7)
where ∆Bij = B
S
ij −B
F
ij .
3 Loan Agreements under Moral Hazard
Corporate social responsibility of both borrowers and lenders is observable, but
lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ behavior.
Remember that motivated borrowers will undertake ethical projects and
eventually trade with ethical banks as long as the expected profit from ethical
projects is not too low with respect to the expected profit from standard ones.
Moreover, ethical banks will finance only ethical projects, in principle, to both
kinds of investor. Instead, commercial banks will potentially finance both kind
of projects.
In this section we will characterize the market structure showing which type
of lender is active in which sector and find conditions for full segmentation.
To do so we will derive optimal contracts that obviously depend on the sector
considered and on the types of the agents trading together.
We assume Bertrand competition among lenders so that banks’ profits are
zero at the equilibrium and borrowers consequently keep all the surplus from
10
loan agreements. In the moral hazard setting, this is equivalent to endowing
the borrowers with all the bargaining power and having them propose the con-
tract to lenders. Following this interpretation, lenders can accept or refuse the
borrower’s proposal. Subsequently, the borrower decides whether to behave or
to misbehave and, finally, uncertainty concerning the project is solved and the
contract is implemented. Finally, the optimal contract maximizes the represen-
tative borrower’s utility under the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint(
ICBkij
)
and the lenders’ participation constraint
(
IRLkij
)
.
To characterize the credit market structure under pure moral hazard we first
derive all optimal contracts possibly signed by standard borrowers in Section
3.1; then all optimal contracts possibly signed by motivated ones in Section
3.2. Finally in Section 3.3, for both borrowers’ types we identify the preferred
contract and we find out the equilibrium arising in the market for standard
projects and in the one for ethical projects respectively.
More in details, we proceed in the following way: (i) in Subsection 3.1.1, we
find out the optimal contract signed by standard borrowers when contracting
standard projects with standard lenders. (ii) In Subsection 3.1.2, we character-
ize the optimal contract signed by standard borrowers when investing in ethical
projects (which is the same whatever the type of the bank) and we conclude that
standard borrowers always prefer to undertake standard projects (with standard
lenders). (iii) We observe that motivated borrowers, when they invest in stan-
dard projects with standard banks, receive the very same contract as standard
borrowers do (see Subsection 3.2.1). (iv) We characterize the contract signed by
motivated borrowers when investing in ethical projects with standard lenders
and with ethical banks respectively, and we observe that the latter contract is
necessarily dominating the former one (see Subsection 3.2.2).
From the previously described facts we just learn the following: standard
borrowers always sign a contract with a standard bank for a standard project,
whereas motivated borrowers can either sign the very same contract or they can
invest in an ethical project with an ethical bank. Thus, the market structure
arising at the equilibrium depends on the motivated borrowers’ choice between
investing in a standard project with a standard bank or in an ethical one with
an ethical bank. (v) To find out the motivated borrowers’ preferred choice we
compare their profits under the two previous contracts and we show that moti-
vated borrowers are willing to trade with ethical banks only when the premium
for successful interaction is sufficiently high (and/or the difference in profitabil-
ity between the two projects types is sufficiently low). This allows us to identify
conditions such that the market for ethical projects exists and thus ethical banks
can operate.
3.1 Standard Borrowers
We now describe optimal contracts for standard borrowers when they invest in
standard and in ethical projects respectively.
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3.1.1 Standard borrowers undertaking standard projects
When borrowers undertake a standard project, they will trade with a standard
bank. The contract is denoted by (BS000 , B
F0
00 , I
0
00). We recall that the subscript
00 denotes a contract between standard borrowers and standard banks and
the superscript 0 means that the borrowers invest in standard projects. The
incentive compatibility constraint of borrowers is
(
ICB000
)
:
pH ·B
S0
00 + (1− pH)B
F0
00 −A ≥ pL ·B
S0
00 + (1− pL)B
F0
00 + P · I
0
00 −A
that is:
∆B0
00
≥
PI000
∆p
(8)
where ∆B0
00
= BS000 −B
F0
00 , which is the difference in the borrower’s revenue in
case of success and failure, for given contract.
Following Tirole (2006), chapter 3, the problem of a borrower contracting a
loan for a standard project with a standard lender becomes:
max
∆
B0
00
,BF0
00
,I0
00
pH∆B0
00
+BF000 −A
s.t. ∆B0
00
≥ PI
0
00
∆p
(
ICB000
)(
pH∆R0 +R
F − 1
)
I000 − pH∆B000
−BF000 +A ≥ 0
(
IRL000
) (9)
where the participation constraint for standard lenders
(
IRL000
)
has been ob-
tained from inequality (7).11
In Subsection 3.2.1 we will observe that the contract (BS0∗00 ,B
F0∗
00 , I
0∗
00 ) is
also offered to motivated borrowers trading with standard banks and we will
prove that it is a debt contract. Thus, we refer the reader to Subsection 3.2.1
for the characterization of the contract solving Program (9) and its economic
interpretation.
3.1.2 Standard borrowers undertaking ethical projects
The standard borrower can undertake an ethical project either with an ethical
or with a standard bank. In the two cases the problem to be solved is identical
and the contract is denoted by (BS1i0 , B
F1
i0 , I
1
i0), where the subscript i0 means
11Moreover, always following Tirole (2006), we assume that:
pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
+RF < 1 (10)
therefore I0
00
has to be finite:
I00j ≤
A−BF0
0j
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
(11)
the previous inequality expresses the borrowing capacity of the entrepreneur, contracting with
a profit maximizing lender in the case of a standard project.
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that we are considering standard borrowers indifferently trading with either a
standard or an ethical bank and the superscript 1 means that the borrowers
invest in ethical projects.
The program here is identical to (9), except for the fact that the expected rev-
enue of the ethical project is lower than that of the standard one (∆R1 < ∆R0).
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Thus, we can easily prove that the optimal contract for a standard borrower un-
dertaking an ethical project is a debt contract with the same structure than
the contract solving (9) but lower expected revenue in the case of success,
BS1∗i0 < B
S0∗
00 , and lower borrowing capacity, I
1∗
i0 < I
0∗
00 .
The standard borrower obviously makes higher profits with a standard project
than with an ethical one and therefore will always prefer the former to the lat-
ter. This implies that standard borrowers will always perform standard projects
financed by standard lenders.
Lemma 1 Standard borrowers under pure moral hazard:
• when undertaking an ethical project, standard borrowers are indifferent
between contracting with a standard bank and contracting with an ethical
one since they receive the same contract (BS1∗i0 , B
F1∗
i0 , I
1∗
i0 ).
• Standard borrowers always prefer to undertake standard projects with stan-
dard banks. At the second-best equilibrium they will therefore sign the
contract (BS0∗00 , B
F0∗
00 , I
0∗
00 ) characterized in (12) below.
We now are going to describe all optimal contracts potentially signed by
motivated borrowers.
3.2 Motivated Borrowers
We just saw that two different contracts are potentially available to standard
borrowers: the one signed in the case of standard projects (BS0∗00 , B
F0∗
00 , I
0∗
00 )
and the one in the case of ethical projects (BS1∗i0 , B
F1∗
i0 , I
1∗
i0 ), where the latter
is independent of the type of the bank. Motivated borrowers, instead, can
potentially sign three different contracts: two contracts with standard lenders,
in the case of standard (BS0∗01 , B
F0∗
01 , I
0∗
01 ) and ethical projects (B
S1∗
01 , B
F1∗
01 , I
1∗
01 )
respectively, and a contract with ethical banks (BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ). Importantly,
we will show that motivated borrowers undertaking ethical projects receive a
different contract when trading with standard banks and when trading with
ethical ones: (BS1∗01 , B
F1∗
01 , I
1∗
01 ) = (B
S1∗
11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ). This depends on the
additional premium for successful interactions that arises when agents aware of
social issues trade together.
12To derive the optimal contract we assume that inequalities (10) and (11) holds for ethical
projects as well.
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3.2.1 Motivated borrowers undertaking standard projects
Remember that, when investing in standard projects, motivated borrowers are
equivalent to standard ones. This implies that motivated borrowers undertak-
ing standard projects with standard banks receive the same contract as stan-
dard borrowers, that is the contract derived by Program (9) in Subsection 3.1.1.
Thus, (BS0∗01 , B
F0∗
01 , I
0∗
01 )= (B
S0∗
00 , B
F0∗
00 , I
0∗
00 )= (B
S0∗
0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ), where the sub-
script 0j means that we are considering standard lenders indifferently trading
with either a standard or a motivated borrower.
Lemma 2 The optimal contract for both motivated and standard borrowers un-
dertaking a standard project financed by a standard lender under moral-hazard
is the debt contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) such that:
I0∗0j =
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
BS0∗0j =
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
=
PI0∗0j
∆p
(12)
BF0∗0j = 0.
Proof. See the appendix A.1.
The implications of the formulas in Lemma 2 are the usual ones in these kinds
of models. From (12), firms’ borrowing capacity I0∗0j is increasing in tangible
assets A, i.e. the higher is A, the lower is credit rationing. Borrowing capacity
I0∗0j is also decreasing in agency costs (private benefit, P , or inverse likelihood
ratio, pH∆p ). The fact that B
F0∗
0j = 0, instead, implies that the optimal contract is
a debt one, which gives the highest incentives of behaving to the entrepreneur,
which is the well known Jensen and Meckling (1976) result.
3.2.2 Motivated borrowers undertaking ethical projects
We first consider the optimal contract signed by motivated borrowers undertak-
ing ethical projects financed by standard banks. Remind that, in this case, the
premium for social responsibility is θS101 = θ
F1
01 = θ. Interestingly, we will show
that standard banks offer the same contract to both types of borrowers, despite
the fact that the premium θ, accruing motivated borrowers investing in ethical
projects, becomes active in this case.
The contract between a motivated borrower and a standard bank when un-
dertaking an ethical project is denoted by (BS101 ,B
F1
01 , I
1
01). In this case the
borrowers’ incentive compatibility constraint is
(
ICB101
)
:
pH ·
(
BS101 + θ
)
+ (1− pH)
(
BF101 + θ
)
−A ≥
pL ·
(
BS101 + θ
)
+ (1− pL)
(
BF101 + θ
)
+ P · I101 −A
or
pH ·B
S1
01 + (1− pH)B
F1
01 ≥ pL ·B
S1
01 + (1− pL)B
F1
01 + P · I
1
01
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that is:
∆B1
01
≥
PI101
∆p
(13)
where ∆B1
01
= BS101 − B
F1
01 . Note that, since the premium θ has no impact on
the incentive compatibility constraint of the motivated borrower, (13) is similar
to constraint (8) before.13 We can state:
Remark 1 The premium for social responsibility θ affects the payoff of the mo-
tivated borrower but not the contract that she signs with the standard bank; thus,
in the case of ethical projects, standard lenders offer the same contract to both
types of borrowers, or (BS1∗00 , B
F1∗
00 , I
1∗
00 ) = (B
S1∗
01 , B
F1∗
01 , I
1∗
01 ) = (B
S1∗
0j , B
F1∗
0j , I
1∗
0j ).
We now consider contracts (BS111 , B
F1
11 , I
1
11) that are designed for motivated
borrowers interacting with ethical banks. Recall that ∆θ is the premium for
successful interaction that a motivated borrower obtains when trading with an
ethical bank in the case of successful project. Thus, the incentive compatibility
constraint of a motivated borrower trading with an ethical bank writes:
pH
(
BS111 + θ +∆θ
)
+ (1− pH)
(
BF111 + θ
)
−A ≥
pL
(
BS111 + θ +∆θ
)
+ (1− pL)
(
BF111 + θ
)
+ PI111 −A
that is:
∆B1
11
+∆θ ≥
PI111
∆p
(15)
where ∆B1
11
= BS111 −B
F1
11 .
If ∆θ is sufficiently high, the previous incentive compatibility constraint is
more easily satisfied than the one before (see inequality 13). In different words,
if the premium for successful interaction ∆θ is sufficient to compensate ethical
projects’ low profitability, ethical banks and motivated borrowers interacting
together can implement more efficient contracts, as we show below.
Considering the motivated borrowers’ choice whether to invest in ethical
projects either with a standard or with an ethical bank we can state:
13Thus, both standard and motivated borrowers trading with a commercial bank receive
a contract with higher borrowing capacity and higher expected profit if they undertake a
standard project. However, since motivated borrowers undertaking an ethical project with a
standard bank also receive the premium θ, they could nevertheless prefer an ethical project
with worse borrowing condition (BS1∗
0j , B
F1∗
0j , I
1∗
0j ) to a standard one under the contract
(BS0∗
0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ). A sufficient condition is that the social responsibility parameter θ is high
enough, in particular:
θ ≥ p2H
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
∆R0 −∆R1
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
= θ (14)
Condition (14) is obtained considering that the motivated borrower prefers the ethical project
financed by a standard bank to a standard one if the following inequality holds:
pH∆B1
01
+BF101 + θ −A ≥ pH∆B0
00
+BF000 −A
(14) is a direct consequence of the previous inequality after substituting the values appearing
in the optimal contracts (BS0∗
00
, BF0∗
00
, I0∗
00
) and (BS1∗
01
, BF1∗
01
, I1∗
01
).
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Remark 2 When undertaking an ethical project, motivated borrowers will al-
ways prefer to trade with an ethical bank rather than with a standard lender. In
fact, interacting with an ethical bank, they obtain a contract that is at least as
profitable as the one they can obtain from a standard bank and they also receive
the premium ∆θ for successful interaction .
Despite the presence of the premium for successful interaction ∆θ, we can
follow the same steps as in the previous cases. In particular, the problem of a
representative motivated borrower trading with an ethical bank is:
max
∆
B1
11
,BF1
11
,I1
11
pH∆B1
11
+ pH∆θ + θ +B
F1
11 −A
s.t. ∆B1
11
+∆θ ≥
PI1
11
∆p
(
ICB111
)(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
I111 − pH∆B1
11
−
BF111 +A ≥ 0
(
IRL111
) (16)
The optimal contract is characterized as follows:
Lemma 3 The contract for a motivated borrower trading with an ethical bank
under moral-hazard is a debt contract (BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) such that:
I1∗11 =
A+ pH∆θ
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
BS1∗11 =
P
∆p
A+ pH∆θ
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
−∆θ (17)
BF1∗11 = 0
Proof. See the appendix A.2.
Note that, in the debt contract (BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ), the premium for successful
interaction ∆θ positively affects the borrowing capacity I
1∗
11 of the motivated
investors, while its impact on the expected return in case of success BS1∗11 is
ambiguous.
From results in this and in the previous subsection we learnt the following:
standard borrowers always sign a contract with a standard bank for a standard
project, whereas motivated borrowers can either sign the very same contract or
they can invest in an ethical project with an ethical bank. Thus, as we anticipated
before, the market structure arising at the equilibrium depends on the motivated
borrowers’ choice between investing in a standard project with a standard bank
or in an ethical one with an ethical bank.
In order to find out conditions such that a motivated borrower prefers to
undertake an ethical project with an ethical bank than a standard project with a
standard bank, the next step will be to compare contracts (BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) and
(BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) and the motivated borrowers’ pay-off under the two contracts.
As we will see, since the ethical bank is more efficient in solving the moral hazard
problem of the motivated borrowers, it is possible that ethical banks offer better
contract conditions even if ethical projects imply lower expected returns.
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3.3 The Equilibrium under pure moral hazard
The comparison of the two contracts (BS1∗11 ,B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) and (B
S0∗
0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j )
allows us to compute a few critical levels for the parameter of successful inter-
action ∆θ which will be useful to characterize the equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Motivated borrowers trading with an ethical bank:
• have a higher borrowing capacity than when undertaking a standard project
with a standard lender
(
I1∗11 > I
0∗
0j
)
if:
∆θ ≥ (∆R0 −∆R1) I
0∗
0j ≡ ∆θ (18)
• obtain higher expected net profits than when undertaking a standard project
with a standard lender (BS1∗11 > B
S0∗
0j ) if:
∆θ ≥
pHP
∆p
(∆R0 −∆R1) I
0∗
0j
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
=
pHB
S0∗
0j
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
(∆R0 −∆R1) ≡ ∆θ
(19)
where condition (19) implies condition (18), or ∆θ < ∆θ.
Proof. See the Appendix A.3.
As one can check, both conditions (18) and (19) require that the expected
profit from the ethical projects is not too small compared to that from the other
projects (∆R0 −∆R1 is low), or that the premium for successful interaction ∆θ
is high enough.
The first condition, ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, in Lemma 4 has a simple interpretation.
The premium for successful interaction has to be greater than the difference in
expected revenue between standard and ethical projects, for unit of investment.
If this condition holds, in a sense, the motivation of the agents acts as an
additional collateral, that we may call “ethical collateral”.
The second condition, ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, is more tricky to interpret. The ratio
(∆R0−∆R1)I
0∗
0j
pH∆R1+R
F−1 is the rate of increase in profitability from ethical to standard
projects with respect to the profit of the ethical project, while the term pHP∆p
represents the agency costs to be paid for letting standard borrowers commit to a
correct behavior, P∆p , weighted for the probability of having to bear those costs,
pH. Summarizing, ∆θ represents the agency cost that the standard borrower
has to pay in order to (make it credible to) behave, weighted for the expected
rate of increase of profitability in turning to a standard project.
Lemma 4 allows us to fully compare the two contracts (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) and
(BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) depending on the magnitude of the premium for successful
interaction ∆θ. If the premium for successful interaction is high, ∆θ ≥ ∆θ,
motivated borrowers trading with ethical banks receive a contract character-
ized by higher expected profits (BS1∗11 > B
S0∗
0j ) and higher borrowing capacity(
I1∗11 > I
0∗
0j
)
than when trading with a standard bank. In fact, the relationship
becomes very efficient in solving the moral hazard problem and this more than
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compensates the lower expected revenue of ethical projects. The opposite sit-
uation arises when the premium for successful interaction is low, ∆θ < ∆θ:
motivated borrowers trading with ethical banks receive a contract with lower
expected profits (BS1∗11 < B
S0∗
0j ) and lower borrowing capacity
(
I1∗11 < I
0∗
0j
)
than
when trading with a standard bank. Here the lower expected returns from eth-
ical projects prevails over the benefit from solving the moral hazard problem
more efficiently. If ∆θ belongs to an intermediate range, ∆θ ≤ ∆θ ≤ ∆θ, then
the motivated borrowers get a lower expected profit (BS1∗11 < B
S0∗
0j ), but a higher
borrowing capacity
(
I1∗11 > I
0∗
0j
)
by dealing with an ethical bank.
Now we can finally obtain the preferred choice of the motivated borrowers.
Obviously, if ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, then motivated borrowers prefer to trade with socially
responsible lenders since, by doing so, they can both benefit from the total
premium for social responsibility pH∆θ+θ and from a higher expected revenue
BS1∗11 . Moreover, it is easy to check that motivated borrowers prefer to trade
with ethical banks even when ∆θ ≤ ∆θ ≤ ∆θ.
Suppose now that ∆θ < ∆θ. Motivated borrowers receive in this case a
higher loan and a higher expected profit when they undertake a standard project
contracting with standard lenders. However, they still prefer to trade with
socially responsible banks if the total premium for social responsibility pH∆θ+θ
more than compensates the lower expected profit:
Lemma 5 Motivated borrowers prefer to contract with ethical banks than with
standard ones for ∆θ ≥ ∆˜θ (θ) , where:
∆˜θ (θ) = max
{
0,∆θ −
∆p
p2HP
(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
θ
}
(20)
with ∆˜θ (θ) decreasing in θ when strictly positive, and ∆˜θ (θ) ≤ ∆θ∀θ.
If θ = 0, then ∆˜θ (θ) = ∆θ and the necessary condition for motivated bor-
rowers to trade with socially responsible lenders is more stringent.
Proof. See the Appendix A.4.
The previous Lemma shows that motivated borrowers will accept a loan
from ethical banks if the premium for successful interaction ∆θ is higher than
the threshold value ∆˜θ (θ) which depends on θ. In particular, ∆˜θ (θ) is decreas-
ing in θ and is always weakly lower than ∆θ. Namely, if ∆θ ≥ ∆˜θ (θ) , then
motivated borrowers prefer to trade with socially responsible lenders even if
this implies signing the worst contract. Thus, if ∆θ ≥ ∆˜θ (θ), the contract
(BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) can be indicated as (B
S0∗
00 , B
F0∗
00 , I
0∗
00 ) since it is signed only
by standard borrowers. As a consequence the market is fully segmented in that
case.
When on the contrary ∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ) , motivated borrowers will prefer to
trade with standard lenders since the total premium pH∆θ + θ is not enough to
compensate the worst contract conditions. This implies that ethical banks are
not active in the credit market in this case.
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Interestingly, given condition (20) and if the premium for social responsibility
θ is zero, then ∆˜θ (θ) = ∆θ and motivated borrowers prefer to trade with socially
responsible lenders only if, by doing so, they receive at least a higher borrowing
capacity
(
I1∗11 > I
0∗
0j
)
.
Note also that, if the premium for social responsibility θ is sufficiently high,
then ∆˜θ (θ) in (20) becomes zero and we obtain a situation where motivated
borrowers always prefer to trade with ethical banks, whatever the premium for
successful interaction.
The following proposition summarizes results in Section 3:
Proposition 1 Moral hazard. Suppose that borrowers’ type is observable, but
lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ behavior.
• When ∆θ ≥ ∆˜θ (θ), then the credit market is fully segmented and the debt
contracts (BS0∗00 , B
F0∗
00 , I
0∗
00 ) and (B
S1∗
11 ,B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) are signed by standard
and motivated borrowers respectively.
1. If ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, then the contracts are such that I1∗11 > I
0∗
00 and B
S1∗
11 >
BS0∗00 .
2. If ∆θ ≤ ∆θ ≤ ∆θ, the contracts are such that: I
1∗
11 > I
0∗
00 and B
S1∗
11 <
BS0∗00 .
3. If ∆˜θ (θ) < ∆θ ≤ ∆θ, the contracts are such that: I
1∗
11 < I
0∗
00 and
BS1∗11 < B
S0∗
00 .
• When 0 ≤ ∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ), then socially responsible banks are not active
and the market for ethical projects does not exist: all borrowers accept the
contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) offered by standard lenders.
Proposition 1 shows that, if ∆θ ≥ ∆˜θ (θ), two separated credit markets are
created: one market for ethical projects where only agents aware of social issues
trade with each other and one for standard projects where only standard agents
operate. In fact, when the premium for successful interaction is sufficiently high
(and θ is strictly positive), then the total premium for social responsibility
pH∆θ + θ more than compensates the worse contract conditions so that mo-
tivated borrowers prefer to undertake ethical projects contracting with ethical
banks.
Interestingly, when θ = 0, conditions for market segmentation are stricter
(∆˜θ (θ) ≡ ∆θ) since motivated borrowers trade with ethical banks only if they
receive a contract at least characterized by higher borrowing capacity: I1∗11 > I
0∗
00 .
On the contrary, if ∆˜θ (θ) = 0, meaning that θ is relatively large, then the
ethical banks are always active because the premium for social responsibility
is so high that the motivated borrowers always prefer an ethical project to a
standard one, even if the premium for successful interaction is nought. We will
discuss this possibility at the end of this section.
Note that, when the premium for successful interaction is sufficiently high(
∆θ ≥ ∆θ
)
, motivated borrowers obtain a contract that is more profitable than
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the one signed by the standard borrowers, since the matching between agents
aware of social issues allows the inefficiency due to moral hazard to decrease.
The result obtained for ∆θ ≥ ∆θ is perfectly in line with Besley and Ghatak’s
(2005), where mission oriented workers perfectly match with mission oriented
firms of the same type and social productivity increases.
When 0 ≤ ∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ) , then the market for ethical projects does not exist
since the total premium for social responsibility pH∆θ + θ is not sufficient to
compensate the lower expected profits from ethical projects. In such a case,
motivated borrowers behave exactly as standard ones and both the efficiency
gain from assortative matching and the social benefit from ethical projects are
fully lost.14
Our results are summarized in Figure 1 below. In the figure, the relative
expected profitability of standard and ethical projects is taken as given and the
threshold values characterized in Lemmas 4 and 5 are depicted. The second
best contracts are compared and the market segmentation is illustrated as a
function of the premium for successful interaction ∆θ.
Only the market 
for standard 
projects exists
the credit market is fully segmented
Ethical banks are active and 
I0j0* I111*>
B0jS0* B11S1*>
and I0j0* I111*<
B0jS0* B11S1*>
and I0j0* I111*<
B0jS0* B11S1*<
and
Δ̃θ(θ) Δ θ Δ θ
Δθ
Figure 1. Pure moral hazard (second-best): given the relative expected
returns of standard and ethical projects, second-best contracts depend on the
magnitude of the premium for successful interaction as illustrated in
Proposition 1.
∆θWe conclude this section with some remarks on the role exerted by θ and
∆θ in our model. Recall that the term pH∆θ + θ represents the total premium
for social responsibility possibly received by motivated borrowers. Since the
premium for successful interaction ∆θ is multiplied by the probability pH , its
contribution to the total premium for social responsibility is lower than the one
of θ. However, note that the beneficial effect of the matching between agents
aware of social issues is totally driven by the premium for successful interaction
∆θ. Indeed all our results still hold when θ = 0, that is when motivated borrow-
14This result is driven, among other things, by the discrete nature of the choice between
profit maximizing and ethical projects and contrasts with Besley and Ghatak (2007) where
caring consumers always delegate to firms the production of a positive amount of the public
good, which is represented by a continuous variable.
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ers do not receive any premium for undertaking ethical projects with standard
banks.15 We can conclude that the premium for successful interaction has a
low direct impact on expected utility of motivated borrowers, nevertheless it
represents the crucial ingredient in our model.
Considering again our results when θ = 0, the region where ethical banks are
not active always exists, in this case, and corresponds to ∆θ ∈
[
0, ∆˜θ (θ) = ∆θ
]
.
On the contrary, when the premium θ is strictly positive, in principle it can be
∆˜θ (θ) = 0 implying that ethical banks are always active. However, the scenario
where ethical banks always exist is not particularly interesting nor particularly
reasonable, since motivated borrowers, in this case, are willing to invest in ethical
projects “by definition”. As it was mentioned in Section 2, we find it more
realistic to assume that motivated borrowers are willing to undertake ethical
projects as long as their social engagement is not too costly in terms of material
payoffs. Put it differently, we expect motivated borrowers to behave as standard
ones when the gains in profits are sufficiently high. This implies that, in our
view, the premium θ should be sufficiently low with respect to the difference in
projects’ profitability to assure that a region where ethical banks are not active
also exists when θ is strictly positive, or:
0 ≤ θ ≤
p2HP (∆R0 −∆R1)A
∆p
(
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
) = θmax,
where θmax is the value of the premium for social responsibility such that the
threshold value ∆˜θ (θ) is zero.
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4 Loan Agreements under Moral Hazard and
Adverse Selection
We consider here the following information structure: lenders’ corporate so-
cial responsibility is common knowledge, but lenders cannot observe neither the
borrowers’ behavior nor the borrowers’ motivation. As already mentioned, this
setting fits a situation where lenders are banks with well known characteristics,
while borrowers are new firms without reputation. This environment is inter-
esting since, when the premium for successful interaction is sufficiently high,
motivated borrowers trading with ethical banks obtain better contract condi-
tions than standard borrowers trading with standard lenders (see Proposition 1
above). Thus, standard borrowers could take advantage of their private infor-
mation by pretending to be motivated. In this latter case ethical banks could
15 θ = 0 was precisely our assumption in a previous version of the paper.
16 In particular, the value θmax satisfies:
∆θ −
∆p
p2
H
P
(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
θ = ∆˜θ (θ) = 0
(see the end of Appendix A.4).
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obtain negative profits, since standard borrowers mimicking motivated ones pos-
sibly misbehave, which amount to saying that the contract (BS1∗11 ,B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) is
not necessarily incentive compatible for standard borrowers.
Lenders here know that the percentage of motivated borrowers in the credit
market is q whereas that of standard ones is 1− q. We call this game the third-
best.
To solve the model with both moral hazard and adverse selection on the
borrowers’ type we proceed as follows. (i) We show that the third-best con-
tract corresponds to the second best when ∆θ < ∆θ. (ii) We characterize the
self-selecting contracts for ∆θ ≥ ∆θ and we show that, at the equilibrium,
standard borrowers receive the second-best contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) whereas
motivated ones receive the third-best contract (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ), which is
distorted with respect to (BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ). (iii) We find a sufficient condi-
tion such that the equilibrium contracts (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) and (B
S1∗∗
11 , B
F1∗∗
11 ,
I1∗∗11 ) are (constrained) efficient. Finally, (iv) we conclude that also existence
is assured when the previous condition is met. Notice that borrowers are the
informed party. Therefore we are considering a case similar to that of contract
design by an informed principal (see Maskin and Tirole 1992 and also Tirole
2006, page 264). However, our problem is slightly different. On the one hand,
this problem is more complicated because we also have moral-hazard and there
are two types of agents (the ethical and the profit maximizing bank). On the
other hand our model is simpler, because competition among banks allows us
to restrict the attention to optimal contracts, as discussed in the end of the
section, that is, we can restrict our attention to what Tirole (2006, page 264)
defines the “low-information-intensity optimum”.
Since borrowers’ motivation is part of the borrowers’ private information, in
the new set-up we have to consider also the self-selection constraint. Obviously,
if second-best contracts (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) and (B
S1∗
11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) defined before
verify such a self-selection constraint, then those contracts can also be offered
in third-best (they are envy free).
From Proposition 1, all borrowers’ types prefer contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j )
in the second best, if ∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ). In this case ethical banks are not active and
the two borrowers’ types become identical since motivated borrowers do not
receive any premium for social responsibility. Therefore, Proposition 1 implies
straightforwardly that, when ∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ) , standard lenders offer the second-
best contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) to all borrowers, also in the third best.
Let us consider now higher levels of the premium for successful interaction
and check whether borrowers have incentive to lie. From Proposition 1 we know
that, in second-best, motivated borrowers prefer contract (BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) to
contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) when ∆θ ≥ ∆˜θ (θ). Moreover, standard borrowers
prefer contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) to contract (B
S1∗
11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) when ∆θ ≤ ∆θ
since, with the first contract, they receive a higher expected utility than with
the latter one. In fact:
pH∆B0∗
0j
+BF0∗0j −A > pH∆B1∗
11
+BF1∗11 −A
22
where ∆B0∗
0j
> ∆B1∗
11
.
Summarizing, from the previous reasoning we know that when ∆˜θ (θ) ≤
∆θ ≤ ∆θ, the second best contracts (B
S0∗
0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) ≡ (B
S0∗
00 , B
F0∗
00 , I
0∗
00 ) and
(BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) are envy free and can also be offered in third-best. In this
case the credit market is fully segmented and no distortions are necessary to
separate borrowers’ types. Whereas, when ∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ), only standard lenders
are active in the credit market and the second-best contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j )
is offered to both borrowers’ types.
We consider now the most interesting case where ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, that is, the
premium for successful interaction more than compensates ethical projects’ low
profitability. Here both borrowers’ types prefer contract (BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) since
the latter leads to a higher expected utility than (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ).
Again, because of the assumption of Bertrand competition among (both
types of) lenders, borrowers are endowed with all the bargaining power and
obtain all the surplus from trade in equilibrium. Thus, we can solve the model
as in Section 3 by finding the optimal contract for the borrowers under both
their incentive compatibility and their self-selection constraint.
Note that in third-best, also when ∆θ > ∆θ, commercial banks still offer the
second-best contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) since all borrowers are the same when
trading with standard lenders and no adverse selection issues arise:
Lemma 6 In third-best, standard banks offer the second-best contract (BS0∗0j ,
BF0∗0j , I
0∗
0j ) whatever the size of the premium for successful interaction, ∆θ.
Instead, when ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, ethical banks must offer a self-selecting contract
to prevent standard borrowers from mimicking motivated ones and possibly
misbehaving.
The separating allocation with no cross subsidization between types of bor-
rowers offered by ethical banks is the contract (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ) for motivated
borrowers and the second-best contract (BS1∗10 , B
F1∗
10 , I
1∗
10 ) for standard ones
17 .
The contract (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ) maximizes motivated borrowers’ payoff sub-
ject to the motivated borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint, the ethical
lender’s participation constraint and subject to standard borrowers not prefer-
ring (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ) to (B
S1∗
10 , B
F1∗
10 , I
1∗
10 ). A detailed discussion on the
self-selection constraint will follow.
17Note that the second-best contract (BS1∗
10
, BF1∗
10
, I1∗
10
) was not part of the second-best
equilibrium described in Proposition 1 since standard borrowers always prefer to undertake
standard projects with standard banks when their type is observable. Nevertheless, here we
are looking for the self-selecting contracts offered by ethical banks and thus we must consider
the two contracts that ethical banks design for the two types of existing borrowers. However,
in order to decrease distortions necessary for separation of types, in a few lines we will consider
again the contract obtained in the second-best equilibrium (BS0∗
00
, BF0∗
00
, I0∗
00
) (see constraint
22).
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The program writes:
max
∆
B1
11
,BF1
11
,I1
11
pH∆B1
11
+ pH∆θ + θ +B
F1
11 −A
s.t. ∆B1
11
+∆θ ≥
P
∆p
I111
(
ICB111
)(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
I111
−pH∆B1
11
−BF111 +A ≥ 0
(
IRL111
)
pHB
S1∗
10 ≥ pL∆B111 +B
F1
11 + PI
1
11
(
SSB11
)
(21)
From Lemma 1 a standard borrower always prefers contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j )
to contract (BS1∗10 , B
F1∗
10 , I
1∗
10 ), since standard projects have higher expected
returns. Thus, a standard borrower will never choose the second-best contract
(BS1∗10 , B
F1∗
10 , I
1∗
10 ) in the third-best equilibrium, it will instead sign the preferred
contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) with standard banks. For this reason we can consider
the following modified self-selection constraint where BS0∗0j is substituted to
BS1∗10 in the l.h.s. of the inequality
(
SSB11
)
:
pHB
S0∗
0j ≥ pL∆B1
11
+BF111 + PI
1
11 (22)
Since BS0∗0j > B
S1∗
10 , the previous substitution allows us to impose a lower dis-
tortion to contract (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ) in order to obtain separation.
Note that, both in the self-selection constraints
(
SSB11
)
and in inequality
(22), the mimicker misbehaves (a = 0), so that, in the right-hand-side of the
inequality, the probability of a successful investment is only pL. To understand
why, consider that an ethical bank is in principle indifferent with respect to the
type of investors that are undertaking ethical projects. In other words, if the
contract (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ) is signed by either a standard or a motivated bor-
rower, the ethical bank is equally satisfied, provided that the borrower behaves.
The necessity to design a separate contract for motivated and for standard
borrowers only arises if standard borrowers misbehave when choosing (BS1∗∗11 ,
BF1∗∗11 , I
1∗∗
11 ).
18
We characterize contract (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ) in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 If ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, in the optimal separating contract with no cross sub-
sidization standard borrowers obtain the second-best debt contract. Motivated
borrowers obtain a debt contract with lower revenue and investment than their
second-best contract, but higher investment, than the second best contract offered
to standard borrowers.
Proof. See the Appendix A.6.
When ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, the equilibrium contracts described in the previous Lemma
imply that the “better” type pay the cost of separation from the “worst” agents
18 In Appendix A.5 we show that the solution to program (21) with self-selection constraint
(22) dominates the solution of an alternative program we could consider here; that is a pro-
gram where a pooling contract is offered to both types of borrowers and where the incentive
compatibility constraint also hold for standard borrowers.
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by receiving a distorted allocation. These contracts share this property with
the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) ones, although they are obtained in different
setups.
Notice that the separating contracts described in the previous lemma assure
that motivated borrowers trade with ethical banks whereas standard ones trade
with standard banks. Thus, in the third-best, the credit market is fully seg-
mented not only when ∆˜θ (θ) ≤ ∆θ ≤ ∆θ, as we established before, but also
when ∆θ ≥ ∆θ.
The following proposition summarizes all results in this section:
Proposition 2 Moral hazard and adverse selection on the borrowers’
side: optimal separating contracts with no cross subsidy.
• When ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, standard borrowers sign the second-best contract (B
S0∗
00 ,
BF0∗00 , I
0∗
00 ) with standard lenders. Motivated borrowers sign a debt contract
(BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ) with ethical banks such that B
S1∗∗
11 < B
S0∗
00 , I
1∗∗
11 >
I0∗00 and B
S1∗∗
11 < B
S1∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 < I
1∗
11 . The credit market is fully segmented.
• When ∆˜θ (θ) ≤ ∆θ ≤ ∆θ, the second-best contracts (BS0∗00 , B
F0∗
00 , I
0∗
00 )
and (BS1∗11 , B
F1∗
11 , I
1∗
11 ) are envy free and are also offered in third-best.
The credit market is fully segmented.
• When ∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ) then both borrowers’ types obtain the second-best con-
tract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ). Ethical banks are not active and the market for
ethical projects does not exist.
Recall that, when ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, the premium for successful interaction more
than compensates ethical projects low profitability and, in second-best, moti-
vated borrowers receive a more profitable contract. Thus, in third-best, stan-
dard borrowers are willing to mimic motivated ones and a self-selecting con-
tract is offered to motivated entrepreneurs who are worse off with respect to
the second-best. In particular, motivated borrowers obtain a contract that is
characterized by a higher investment but a lower expected revenue with respect
to standard borrowers, exactly as it occurs in the second-best for value of θ
such that ∆θ ≤ ∆θ ≤ ∆θ (see Proposition 1). When, instead, the premium
for social responsibility is characterized by an intermediate size (∆˜θ (θ) ≤ ∆θ
≤ ∆θ), adverse selection has no bite so that contracts designed for motivated
borrowers in second-best are not attractive for standard ones. Finally, when
standard projects profitability more than compensate the total premium for so-
cial responsibility (∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ)) all borrowers become equivalent to standard
entrepreneurs and no adverse selection issues arise.
Exactly as in the second-best, for ∆θ ≥ ∆˜θ (θ) the market is fully segmented
whereas, for ∆θ < ∆˜θ (θ), the market for ethical projects does not exist since all
borrowers invest in standard projects. The important difference with respect to
the second-best is in the distortion that characterizes the third-best contract for
motivated borrowers when ∆θ ≥ ∆θ. Such a distortion is necessary to separate
borrowers’ types and obviously decreases the efficiency arising in second-best
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from assortative matching between agents characterized by sensitivity to social
issues.
The previous results are summarized in Figure 2 below. The third-best con-
tracts are compared and the market segmentation is illustrated as a function of
the premium for successful interaction ∆θ.
Only the market 
for standard 
projects exists
the credit market is fully segmented
Ethical banks are active and
All borrowers sign 
the second-best 
contract 
The second-best contracts
and
are envy free 
and are offered also in third -best
Third-best contracts are
and
, where 
andB0j
S0*
B0j
F0*
I0j
0*
, ,( )
( B00S0*B00F0* I000*, , )
(B11S1** B11F1** I111**, , )
( B00S0*B00F0* I000*, , )
B11
S1*
B11
F1*
I11
1*
, ,( )
I000* I111**< B00
S0* B11S1**>
ΔθΔ̃θ(θ) Δ θ Δ θ
Figure 2. Moral hazard and screening (third-best): given the relative
expected returns of standard and ethical projects, third-best contracts depend
on the magnitude of the premium for successful interaction as illustrated in
Proposition 2
∆θWe now consider conditions assuring the existence and efficiency of the
third best equilibrium when ∆θ ≥ ∆θ.
In order to prove the existence of the equilibrium with contracts (BS1∗∗11 ,
BF1∗∗11 , I
1∗∗
11 ) for motivated borrowers and (B
S0∗
0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) for standard ones
derived in Lemma 7 when ∆θ ≥ ∆θ, we have to verify that the allocation is
robust to the fact that we remove the restriction of no cross-subsidy between
borrowers. That is, we have to prove that there is no profitable deviation char-
acterized either by a pooling contract or by separating contracts with cross-
subsidizations between the two types of borrowers. In fact, in principle, ethical
banks could find it profitable to increase the expected profit of the standard
borrower in order to lower the distortions of the ethical borrower’s contract.
Interestingly, we will show that, when the third-best equilibrium is efficient,
then existence is assured. We then turn to efficiency. In our setting, the opti-
mal self-selecting allocation offered by ethical banks and without cross-subsidy
between borrowers types would be the couple of contracts (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 )
for motivated borrowers and (BS1∗10 , B
F1∗
10 , I
1∗
10 ) for standard ones. Since, in the
incentive compatible constraint (22), we replaced the contract offered by ethi-
cal banks to standard borrowers (BS1∗10 , B
F1∗
10 , I
1∗
10 ) with the dominant contract
(BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ) offered by standard lenders (thus decreasing the distortion
necessary for separation), the contract characterizes in Lemma 7 is already more
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efficient than that previously mentioned.19 However we can prove a stronger
result about efficiency with quite weak assumptions. In fact, we can prove that
the third-best contract derived in Lemma 7 is Pareto efficient, provided that
q is lower than 12 . That is, under this condition, there is no cross-subsidizing
scheme among banks which can sustain a better set of contracts. Moreover,
if the allocation derived in Lemma 7 is constrained efficient, all the third-best
contracts described in Proposition 2 are constrained efficient too, whatever the
value of ∆θ.
The proof of Proposition 3 is built as follows. As mentioned before, the
self-selecting equilibrium derived in Lemma 7 is constrained efficient if an (al-
ternative) pair of Pareto dominating contracts with cross-subsidies between eth-
ical and standard banks does not exist. In order to check this, in a first step,
we characterize the profit maximizing (loss minimizing) contract for a standard
bank when providing an expected profit to the standard borrower which is equal
to the second best profits plus R. This R is the transfer that has to be paid
by ethical banks to standard ones. Cross subsidization between different types
of banks is possible if ethical banks make positive profits on an alternative con-
tract (BS111 , B
F1
11 , I
1
11) that motivated borrowers prefer to (B
S1∗∗
11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ).
Thus, in the second step, we verify whether a Pareto improving new contract
(BS111 , B
F1
11 , I
1
11) can be offered to motivated borrowers by ethical banks that
also allow to pay the transfer R to standard lenders. We show that for q < 12
this is not possible and hence no Pareto improving contracts with cross-subsidy
between types of banks exists.
Proposition 3 Moral hazard and adverse selection on the borrowers’
side: efficiency. q < 12 is a sufficient condition such that the equilibrium
of third-best with no cross-subsidization between banks is constrained efficient.
However, larger values of q are still compatible with efficiency.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
An important implication of the previous Proposition is that the third-best
equilibrium always exists for q < 12 . In fact, we just proved that no profitable
deviations with cross-subsidies between the two types of banks exist when q < 12
in an equilibrium with assortative matching. Thus, we can conclude that neither
profitable deviations with cross-subsidization between the two types of borrowers
exist when q < 12 . Or, the separating equilibrium derived in Lemma 7 for
∆θ ≥ ∆θ always exists when q <
1
2 .
Corollary 1 Moral hazard and adverse selection on the borrowers’
side: existence. q < 12 is a sufficient condition such that the equilibrium of
third-best exists. However, larger values of q are still compatible with existence.
Thus, if we do not expect that motivated borrowers represent a majority in
the population of investors, the third-best equilibrium described in Proposition
2 exists and it is efficient.20
19Thus, our third-best equilibrium allocation is a particular and more efficient version of
the “low-information-intensity optimum” defined in Tirole (2006, page 264).
20Suppose, on the contrary, that q is so large that our third-best equilibrium is not efficient.
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5 Conclusion
Our paper investigates corporate finance of ethical banks. To the best of our
knowledge this analysis was still missing in the credit markets literature.
In our model two different credit markets exist: the market for standard
projects and the market for ethical ones. We define ethical projects as projects
with both social and economic profitability but a lower expected revenue with
respect to standard ones. We model ethical banks as lenders which are able
to commit to financing only ethical projects so that they are not interested in
operating in the markets for standard projects. Motivated borrowers, instead,
obtain a general benefit (a premium for social responsibility) when they under-
take ethical projects and also an additional benefit from trading with ethical
banks in the case their project is successful. This implies that motivated bor-
rowers prefer to trade with ethical banks as long as the contract conditions are
not too unfavorable with respect to those offered by standard lenders. Under
different information structures, we investigate how ethical banks and motivated
borrowers interact together when credit markets are competitive and also stan-
dard banks and borrowers are active. First we analyze the case where banks
do not observe borrowers’ behavior (the pure moral hazard case). We then in-
vestigate the case where banks do not observe neither borrowers’ behavior nor
borrowers’ motivation (the case of moral hazard and adverse selection on the
borrowers’ side). We show that all optimal contracts are debt ones and we fully
characterize them in the two information structures.
In equilibrium, standard borrowers always prefer to invest in the market for
standard projects, whereas motivated borrowers invest in ethical projects if the
additional premium for successful interaction is high enough. In such a case,
only standard agents operate in the market for standard projects and only agents
aware of social issues trade in the market for ethical projects, implying that the
market is fully segmented. Moreover, if the premium for successful interaction
is even higher, motivated borrowers prefer to invest in ethical projects and the
premium for successful interaction more than compensate the lower profitability
of ethical projects. This implies that, ethical banks induce repayment of their
loan at a lower cost by providing funds to motivated borrowers. In different
words, ethical banks improve market efficiency since they solve more efficiently
the moral hazard problem.
In our model, optimal contracts require the same collateral for all borrowers,
while they specify different amounts of investment for different borrowers. We
could alternatively assume a fixed investment for all the borrowers/projects that
would lead to a different collateral for different borrowers. In this alternative
In such a case the government should intervene to allow for a cross subsidy between banks. In
particular, ethical banks should pay a transfer to standard banks so that standard borrowers
can receive a contract which strictly dominates (BS0∗
00
, BF0∗
00
, I0∗
00
); hence, the self-selection
constraint (22) in the third-best program can be relaxed and a contract that is better than
(BS1∗∗
11
, BF1∗∗
11
, I1∗∗
11
) can be offered to motivated borrowers (see the proof of Proposition 3 for
more details). Note that the credit market would be fully segmented also under this scenario;
however, here the financial activity of ethical banks would partially subsidize standard lenders
and the market for standard projects.
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case and for values of the premium for successful interaction sufficiently high, our
model would predict that motivated borrowers would be asked to provide a lower
collateral with respect to standard borrowers. In different words, motivated
borrowers would have to pay what we can call an “ethical collateral”.
In line with Bénabou and Tirole’s view of CSR, our model interprets ethical
banks as firms correcting some market failures in the credit market. In particu-
lar, in equilibrium, standard lenders are only active in the market for standard
projects so that, without ethical banks, the market for ethical projects would
never exist. Thus, our results suggest that, in the real world, ethical banks can
be welfare improving not only because they can solve more efficiently the moral
hazard problem when interacting with motivated borrowers, but also because
they allow the financing of projects exerting a positive externality to the society.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The following proof is quite standard (see Tirole 2006), however we prefer to
insert it since it turns out to be useful to understanding results in Section 3.
Remember that we are solving a program that is equivalent to Program 9.
It is easy to prove that
(
IRL00j
)
must be satisfied with equality. In fact, if
we assume the opposite, the borrower can add a small and equal amount both
to BS00j and B
F0
0j leaving
(
ICB00j
)
satisfied, but increasing the expected utility.
Hence we have a contradiction.
Notice that, since
(
IRL00j
)
is binding :
pH
(
BS00j −B
F0
0j
)
+BF00j −A = pH
(
RS0 −RF
)
I00j +R
F I00j − I
0
0j
and substituting the previous expression in the objective function, it yields:
max
(
pH∆R0 +R
F − 1
)
I00j
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which implies that the borrower wishes to increase the investment, I00j , as much
as he can. However, according to expression (11), I00j must be finite. Thus, to
assure that the highest as possible value of I00j is reached, also
(
ICB00j
)
has to
be binding.
Now suppose that BF00j > 0. Hence we can clearly decrease it by a small
amount ∂BF00j and increase B
S0
0j by another small amount ∂B
S0
0j in such a way
that:
pH∂B
S0
0j + (1− pH)∂B
F0
0j = 0
In this case
(
IRL00j
)
is still satisfied, U0j is unchanged but, since B
S0
0j increases
while BF00j decreases,
(
ICB00j
)
is now slack, a contradiction. Hence
BF0∗0j = 0.
the lender offers a debt contract to the borrower, with the value of the debt
D, satisfying D > RF I00j . Substituting the above result in (11) and recalling
that this last inequality is satisfied with equality if
(
ICB00j
)
and
(
IRL00j
)
are, we
obtain:
I0∗0j =
A
1−
[
pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
+RF
] (23)
Finally, substituting in
(
ICB00j
)
we obtain the equilibrium revenues of the bor-
rower in the good state.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
As before
(
IRL111
)
should be satisfied with equality and substituting it in the
objective function this implies that the borrower wishes to set I111 as large as
possible. If we can prove that
(
ICB111
)
implies finite I111, the proof can follow
the same lines as in the previous case. Using
(
ICB111
)
in
(
IRL111
)
we obtain:
I111 ≤
A−BF111 +∆θpH
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
(24)
The denominator of the rhs is positive because of (10). Hence I111 has to be
finite. Since the borrower wishes to set I111 as large as possible,
(
ICB111
)
cannot
be slack.
Now suppose that BF111 > 0. We can reach a contradiction according to the
same lines of the profit maximizing borrower. Hence BF111 = 0: again we have
a debt contract. Substituting BF111 = 0 in (24) and in
(
ICB111
)
, where (24) is
taken with equality since both
(
ICB111
)
and
(
IRL111
)
are taken with equality, we
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obtain:
BS1∗11 =
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
∆θ =
BS1∗0j +
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
∆θ
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
The inequality I1∗11 ≥ I
0∗
0j holds if and only if:
A+ pH∆θ
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
≥
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
that is:
∆θ ≥
A (∆R0 −∆R1)
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
= I0∗0j (∆R0 −∆R1)
The socially responsible entrepreneur trading with an ethical bank pays less if:
BS1∗11 > B
S0∗
0j , that is:
P
∆p
A+ pH∆θ
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
−∆θ ≥
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
or:
∆θ
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
≥
PA
∆p
pH (∆R0 −∆R1)(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)(
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
and finally:
∆θ
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
≥
P
∆p
pH (∆R0 −∆R1) I
0∗
0j
which is equivalent to (19). It is easy to prove that
pHP
∆p (pH∆R1 +R
F − 1)
> 1
and hence (19) implies (18).
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Motivated borrowers prefer to trade with socially responsible lenders if, by doing
so, they receive a higher expected utility than the one they would receive with
standard lenders:
pH∆B1∗
11
+ pH∆θ + θ +B
F1∗
11 −A ≥ pH∆B0∗
0j
+BF0∗0j −A
which implies:
pH∆θ + θ ≥ pH
(
∆B0∗
0j
−∆B1∗
11
)
= pH
(
BS0∗0j −B
S1∗
11
)
By substituting BS0∗0j and B
S1∗
11 as from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we find:
pH∆θ+θ ≥ pH
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
−pH
 P
∆p
A+ pH∆θ
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
−∆θ

Rearranging:
θ
p2H
∆p
P
(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
+∆θ ≥ I
0∗
0j (∆R0 −∆R1) = ∆θ
where θ
p2
H
∆p
P
(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
> 0.
Thus, motivated borrowers prefer to trade with ethical banks if:
∆θ ≥ ∆θ −
θ
p2H
∆p
P
(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
= ∆˜θ (θ) < ∆θ
Note that, if θ = 0, then it must be:
∆θ ≥ ∆θ =
A (∆R0 −∆R1)
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
We now derive the value of θ such that ∆˜θ (θ) > 0. Substituting the value
for ∆θ in the previous expression:
∆˜θ (θ) = I
0∗
0j (∆R0 −∆R1)− θ
∆p
p2HP
(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
> 0
Solving for θ we find that ∆˜θ (θ) > 0 when:
θ <
p2HP (∆R0 −∆R1)A
∆p
(
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)(
1− pH
(
∆R1 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
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A.5 Ethical banks offer a pooling contract in third-best
An alternative possibility would be to consider a different program with no self-
selection constraint and where the incentive compatibility constraint
(
ICB11j
)
instead of
(
ICB111
)
must be met, or ∆B1
1j
≥
P
∆p
I11j . In fact, when
(
ICB11j
)
is
verified, a forthiori also
(
ICB111
)
holds. In this case ethical banks would of-
fer a pooling contract (BS1∗∗1j , B
F1∗∗
1j , I
1∗∗
1j ) that is potentially signed by both
borrowers’ types and the program to be solved would be the following:
max
∆
B1
1j
,BF1
1j
,I1
1j
pH∆B1
1j
+ pH∆θ + θ +B
F1
1j −A
s.t. ∆B1
1j
≥
P
∆p
I11j
(
ICB11j
)(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
I11j
−pH∆B1
1j
−BF11j +A ≥ 0
(
IRL11j
) (25)
However the two constraints in (25) are the same that must be considered in or-
der to obtain the optimal second-best contract (BS1∗i0 , B
F1∗
i0 , I
1∗
i0 ) that both types
of lenders offer to standard borrowers undertaking ethical projects (see Subsec-
tion 3.1.2). Moreover, the premia pH∆θ+θ for social responsibility appearing in
the objective function of (25) do not affect the optimal contract. Thus, we ob-
serve that the solution of program (25) must be equivalent to (BS1∗i0 , B
F1∗
i0 , I
1∗
i0 ),
that is to the contract that is not chosen neither by standard nor by motivated
borrowers at the second-best equilibrium. As a consequence, we can conclude
that the more efficient allocation is the one derived by program (21). All the
previous reasoning allows us to conclude that the program to be considered in
the third-best is (21) with self-selection constraint (22).
A.6 Proof of Lemma 7
Remember that the relevant self-selection constraint is the one where the stan-
dard borrower misbehaves. In fact, if the mimicker behaves, then the ethical
bank has no reason to avoid the standard borrower signing the contract designed
for the ethical one. Moreover we relax the self-selection constraint by consider-
ing expected profits the borrower obtains when trading with a standard bank
in second-best. Therefore, the problem to be solved is the following:
max
∆
B1
11
,BF1
11
,I1
11
pH∆B1
11
+ pH∆θ + θ +B
F1
11 −A
s.t. ∆B1
11
+∆θ ≥
P
∆p
I111
(
ICB111
)(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
I111 − pH∆B1
11
−BF111 +A ≥ 0
(
IRL111
)
pHB
S0∗
0j ≥ pL∆B111 +B
F1
11 + PI
1
11
(
SSB11
)
(26)
Notice that in this program
(
SSB11
)
must be binding, otherwise parties could
reach the second-best program which is not feasible by assumption, because
34
in the second-best contracts the profit maximizer borrower would prefer the
motivated borrower’s contract. Hence
pHB
S0∗
0j = pL∆B1
11
+BF111 + PI
1
11
That is:
pH∆B1
11
+BF111 = pHB
S0∗
0j +∆p∆B1
11
− PI111
Let us make the working assumption that the optimal contract is a debt contract,
that is: BF111 = 0. We first characterize the optimal debt contract. Then we
prove that no other contract can do better than the optimal debt one. Notice
that the three constraints in Program 26 can be written as:
I111 ≤
∆p
P
∆B1
11
+
∆p
P
∆θ
(
ICB111
)
I111 ≥
pH∆B1
11
−A
(pH∆R1 +R
F − 1)
(
IRL111
)
I111 ≤
pH
P
BS0∗0j −
pL
P
∆B1
11
(
SSB11
)
In the space
(
∆B1
11
, I111
)
the boundary of the sets are straight lines. That of(
SSB11
)
is negatively sloped while those of the other two are positively sloped.
Suppose now that
(
ICB111
)
is binding and hence holds with equality. Then
substituting
(
ICB111
)
into
(
SSB11
)
(which is binding) we obtain:
pHB
S0∗
0j = pL
(
P
∆p
I111 −∆θ
)
+PI111 =
(
pL
∆p
+ 1
)
PI111−pL∆θ =
pH
∆p
PI111−pL∆θ
that is:
I111 =
∆p
P
BS0∗0j +
∆p
P
pL
pH
∆θ =
∆p
P
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
∆p
P
pL
pH
∆θ =
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
∆p
P
pL
pH
∆θ
and substituting back into
(
ICB111
)
we have the motivated borrower income:
∆B1
11
=
P
∆p
 A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
∆p
P
pL
pH
∆θ
−∆θ
=
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
−
∆p
pH
∆θ
35
We now check if the participation constraint of the lender is satisfied. If we
substitute our result into
(
IRL11
)
we obtain:(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
I111 − pH∆B1
11
+A =(
pH∆B1
11
+RF − 1
) A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
∆p
P
pL
pH
∆θ
−
pH
 P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
−
∆p
pH
∆θ
+A =
−pH
∆R0 −∆R1
1 + P∆p pH −R
F − pH∆R0
A+
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
) ∆p
P
pL
pH
∆θ +∆p∆θ ≥ 0
or: (
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
) ∆p
P
pL
pH
∆θ +∆p∆θ ≥ ApH
∆R0 −∆R1
1 + P∆p pH −R
F − pH∆R0
Recall that, from inequality (19) , we are considering the following set of para-
meter values:
∆θ ≥
pHP
∆p
(∆R0 −∆R1) I
0∗
0j
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
=
pHP
∆p
(∆R0 −∆R1)
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
Hence the participation constraint is surely satisfied if:
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
) ∆p
P
pL
pH
pHP
∆p
(∆R0 −∆R1)
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
pHP
(∆R0 −∆R1)
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
≥
ApH
∆R0 −∆R1
1 + P∆p pH −R
F − pH∆R0
which boils down into
pHP
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
≥ pH − pL = ∆p
or
pH
P
∆p
−
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
= 1 +
P
∆p
pH −R
F − pH∆R1 ≥ 0
which is certainly satisfied for (??). Hence the participation constraint of the
lender is satisfied. This implies that the two constraints,
(
IRL111
)
and
(
ICB111
)
,
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are compatible with each other. That is,
(
IRL111
)
(taken with equality) crosses(
SSB11
)
at a lower investment level, I111, and (more importantly) at a bigger
borrower’s revenue, ∆B1
11
, with respect to
(
ICB111
)
(again taken with equality).
This means that the former is characterized for the highest ∆B1
11
, which is also
BS111 , since B
F1
11 = 0, in the intersection of all constraints. This implies that
in the same point the expected utility of the borrower is the highest, as can
be checked in the figure, considering that the relevant area is inside the three
constraints.
B11
S1
SS 10
BIC10
B
IR11
L
I11
1
Figure 3: The three constraints in the third-best program
The point where
(
IRL11
)
crosses
(
SSB10
)
is characterized by the system[ (
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
−pH
P pL
] [
I111
∆B1
11
]
=
[
−A
pHB
S0∗
0j
]
with solutions:
I111 =
p2HB
S0∗
0j − pLA
pL (pH∆R1 +R
F − 1) + pHP
∆B1
11
=
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
pHB
S0∗
0j +AP
pL (pH∆R1 +R
F − 1) + pHP
This is the optimal debt contract. Now we will prove that this is the best overall
contract. Let us take the system
(
IRL111
)
and
(
SSB11
)
with equality and let us
differentiate it with respect to BF111 , we find the following system:[ (
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
−pH
P pL
]
d
[
I111
∆B1
11
]
=
[
1
−1
]
dBF111
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which implies that:
∂∆B1
11
∂BF111
= −
P + pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
(pH∆R1 +R
F − 1) pL + PpH
(27)
Hence the expected utility varies with dBF111 at the rate:
d
dRFb1
(
pH∆Rb1 +R
F
b1
)
= −
∆p
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
(pH∆R1 +R
F − 1) pL + pHP
< 0
Hence the best contract when
(
SSB11
)
and
(
IRL111
)
are binding is just a debt
contract, that is with BF111 = 0.
If we assume instead that
(
SSB11
)
and
(
ICB111
)
are binding, we can solve(
ICB111
)
for I111 and obtain:
I111 =
∆p
P
∆B1
11
+
∆p
P
∆θ
and substituting into
(
SSB11
)
:
pH∆B1
11
+BF111 = pHB
S0∗
0j −∆p∆θ
Hence the expected utility of the borrower is constant even if we let BF111 vary.
However we already proved that for BF111 = 0 the dominating allocation is that
where
(
IRL11
)
and
(
SSB1
)
are binding, and that the latter is also the optimal
contract. Therefore the best contract for this program is BF111 = 0 and:
BS1∗∗11 =
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
pHB
S0∗
0j +AP
pL (pH∆R1 +R
F − 1) + pHP
Substituting the value of BS0∗0j we obtain:
BS1∗∗11 =
pL
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
+ pHP −∆ppH (∆R0 −∆R1)
pL (pH∆R1 +R
F − 1) + pHP
·
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
while the investment is:
I1∗∗11 =
p2HB
S0∗
0j − pLA
pL (pH∆R1 +R
F − 1) + pHP
and substituting the value of BS0∗0j we obtain:
I1∗∗11 =
pL
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
+ pHP + pLpH (∆R0 −∆R1)
pL (pH∆R1 +R
F − 1) + pHP
·
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
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Note that BS1∗∗11 and I
1∗∗
11 do not depend on ∆θ and, by comparison with ex-
pressions in Lemma 2, they are such that BS1∗∗11 < B
S0∗
0j and I
1∗∗
11 > I
0∗
0j .
Moreover, since when condition (19) holds the contracts are such thatBS1∗11 >
BS0∗0j (see Proposition 1), we have that B
S1∗
11 > B
S0∗
0j > B
S1∗∗
11 . We showed be-
fore that the third-best debt contract is at the intersection between
(
SSB11
)
and(
IRL111
)
. The second-best contract is instead at the intersection between
(
ICB111
)
and, again,
(
IRL111
)
. Moreover, we just proved that
(
SSB11
)
crosses
(
IRL111
)
at a
lower I1∗∗11 than
(
ICB111
)
. Since
(
IRL111
)
is positively sloped, it must also be true
that the level of investment in the third best is lower than in the second best,
I1∗∗11 < I
1∗
11 (see the figure).
A.7 Proof of the Proposition 3
The self-selecting equilibrium derived in Lemma 7 is constrained efficient if an
(alternative) pair of Pareto dominating contracts with cross-subsidies between
ethical and standard banks does not exist. Thus, in a first step, we will derive the
expected profits of a standard bank when providing a new contract (BS000 , B
F0
00 ,
I000) to a standard borrower which grants to the latter the second best expected
profit plus an additional monetary transfer R; then we will check whether this
additional transfer R can be paid by an ethical bank as a cross subsidy to the
standard one. Cross subsidization between different types of banks is possible
if ethical banks make positive profits on an alternative contract (BS111 , B
F1
11 , I
1
11)
that motivated borrowers prefer to (BS1∗∗11 , B
F1∗∗
11 , I
1∗∗
11 ). Thus, in the second
step, we will verify whether a Pareto improving new contract (BS111 , B
F1
11 , I
1
11)
can be offered to motivated borrowers by ethical banks that also allow to pay
the transfer R to standard lenders.
First step. In this step we can define the expected profits of a standard
bank as a function of R. Expected profits are characterized as follows:
max
(
pH∆R0 +R
F − 1
)
I000 − pH∆B0
00
−B0F00 +A
st. ∆B0
00
≥
P
∆p
I000 (IC
0
00)
pH∆B0
00
+B0F00 ≥ pH
P
∆p
A
1−pH
(
∆R0−
P
∆p
)
−RF
+R (PC000)
where the right hand side of (PC000) indicates the standard borrower’s payoff
when she receives the contract (BS0∗0j , B
F0∗
0j , I
0∗
0j ).
The participation constraint of the standard borrower must be binding. If
not the lender can subtract a small and equal amount to B0S00 and B
0F
00 leaving
∆B0
00
unchanged and increasing profits.
By substituting the participation constraint taken with equality into the
objective function, the program becomes:
max
(
pH∆R +R
F − 1
)
I000 +
1−pH∆R0−R
F
1−pH
(
∆R0−
P
∆p
)
−RF
A−R
st. ∆B0
00
≥
P
∆p
I000 (IC
0
00)
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The objective function is thus increasing in I000. Hence also the incentive com-
patibility constraint has to be binding: ∆B0
00
= P∆p I
0
00.
Now, suppose that B0F00 > 0. Then one can decrease B
0F
00 and increase B
0S
00 ,
so that pH∆B0
00
+B0F00 is unchanged. The participation constraint still holds, the
expected profit of the lender is unchanged, but now the incentive compatibility
is slack: a contradiction. Hence it must be B0F00 = 0. Thus we can study the
simplified program:
max
(
pH∆R +R
F − 1
)
I000 − pH∆B0
00
+A
st ∆B0
00
=
PI0
00
∆p
pH∆B0
00
= pH
P
∆p
A
1−pH
(
∆R0−
P
∆p
)
−RF
+R
from the (PC):
∆B0
00
(R) =
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
R
pH
thus substituting in the (IC):
P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
R
pH
=
PI000
∆p
I000 (R) =
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
∆p
PpH
R
substituting∆B0
00
(R) and I000 (R) into the expected profit of the lender we derive
the expected payoff as a function of the cost-minimizing transfer R :
ΠL0 (R) =
(
pH∆R0 +R
F − 1
) A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
∆p
PpH
R
−
= pH
 P
∆p
A
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
+
R
pH
+A
= −
∆p
P
R
pH
(
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
thus ΠL0 (R) < 0 if R > 0 and ΠL0 (R) = 0 if R = 0.
Second step. The commercial bank makes negative profits when offering
the transfer R to the standard borrower. Thus, the amount R can be paid to
standard borrowers only if commercial banks receive it from ethical banks. In
turn this is possible only if the ethical bank makes positive profits on motivated
borrowers. Thus, we must verify whether a cross-subsidy between banks is
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feasible. This can be checked by solving the following program.
max
∆
B1
11
,BF1
11
,I1
11
,R
pH∆B1
11
+BF111 + pH∆θ + θ −A
s.t. ∆B1
11
+∆θ ≥
PI1
11
∆p
(
ICB111
)((
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
I111 − pH∆B1
11
−BF111 +A
)
q
−∆p
P
R
pH
(
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
(1− q) ≥ 0
(
IRL111
)
pHB
S0∗
0j +R ≥ pL∆B111 +B
F1
11 + PI
1
11
(
SSB11
)
where
(
IRL111
)
imposes that the cross subsidy R between the q ethical banks and
the 1 − q standard banks is feasible. Note that expected profits ΠL0 (R) just
derived before appears in the constraint.
We know that the solution when R = 0 and derived in Lemma 1 lies in the
intersection between
(
IRL111
)
and
(
SSB11
)
and corresponds to a debt contract(
BF1∗11 = 0
)
. Totally differentiating the previous two constraints we obtain:[
−
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
pH
−P −pL
]
d
[
I111
∆B1
11
]
=[
−
∆p
PpH
(
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
∆p
)
−RF
)
(1−q)
q
−1
]
dR
Hence:
d∆B1
11
dR
=
pH(pH∆R1+R
F
−1)q−(pH−pL)
(
1−pH
(
∆R0−
P
(pH−pL)
)
−RF
)
(1−q)
pH(PpH+(RF+pH∆R1−1)pL)q
Therefore
d∆
B1
11
dR
< 0 iff:
q <
1
pH(pH∆R1+RF−1)
(pH−pL)
(
1−pH
(
∆R0−
P
(pH−pL)
)
−RF
) + 1
= q¯
and since one can check that:
(pH − pL)
(
1− pH
(
∆R0 −
P
(pH − pL)
)
−RF
)
>
pH
(
pH∆R1 +R
F − 1
)
it must be: q¯ > 12 . Thus, q <
1
2 is a sufficient condition for
d∆
B1
11
dR
< 0.
The previous inequality means that, as R increases, BS111 − B
F1
11 decreases. As
a consequence, if BF111 = 0, we can conclude that the candidate equilibrium
contract with cross-subsidy is not welfare improving.
The three constraints can be rewritten as:
I111 ≤
∆p
P
∆B1
11
+
∆p
P
∆θ
(
ICB111
)
I111 ≥
pH∆B1
11
−A
pH∆R1+R
F−1 +
∆p
P
R
pH
1−pH
(
∆R0−
P
∆p
)
−RF
pH∆R1+R
F−1
(1−q)
q
(
IRL111
)
I111 ≤
pH
P
BS0∗0j −
pL
P
∆B1
11
+ R
P
(
SSB11
)
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Notice that as R increases, the (SS) line in Figure 3 moves up, while line (IR)
moves left.
(
ICB111
)
instead does not move. Hence, the equilibrium could lie on
the intersection between
(
ICB111
)
and
(
IRL111
)
, for R quite big. However from
that point on it would still be true that
d∆
B1
11
dR
< 0, because
(
ICB111
)
is unchanged
and
(
IRL111
)
moves left.
It still remains to be verified whether, in the optimal contract with cross-
subsidy, BF111 = 0. One can check that if the optimal contract is in the intersec-
tion between
(
IRL111
)
and
(
SSB11
)
the
∂∆
B1
11
∂BF1
11
is identical to (27) and negative.
Therefore an increase in BF111 lowers welfare. If the optimal contract is instead
in the intersection between
(
ICB111
)
and
(
IRL111
)
, it is easy to check that an
increase in BF111 would leave the line
(
ICB111
)
unchanged in Figure 3, but move
the line
(
IRL111
)
to the left, and cause a decrease in welfare.
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